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Abstract
Analogy is widely considered to be an important mechanism of scientific thinking and a source of
creative insight in theory development. In this report we consider the implicit constraints that determine
analogical soundness. We first examine the constraints that govern analogical reasoning as it is
predicted today. We then trace the scientific uses of analogy through three time periods and contrast
the styles of analogizing practice by scientists at different points in history. This comparison suggests
that the notion of analogical soundness has evolved over time.
HISTORICAL SHIFTS IN THE USE OF ANALOGY IN SCIENCE
Analogy is widely considered to be an important mechanism of scientific thinking and a source of
creative insight in theory development (e.g., Tweney, 1989). No less an authority than Johannes Kepler
stated: "And I cherish more than anything the Analogies, my most trustworthy masters. They know all
the secrets of Nature, and they ought to be least neglected in Geometry" (quoted in Polya, 1954, p. 12).
In addition to its uses in scientific discovery, analogy functions as part of the workaday tool kit of
science. In instruction, novices are told to think of electricity as analogous to water or of addition as
analogous to piling up blocks, and in problem-solving analogy is a standard tool among both experts and
novices (e.g., see Clement, 1981; Collins & Gentner, 1987; Gentner & Gentner, 1983; Van Lehn &
Brown, 1980). Finally analogy is also used in everyday reasoning, as when the stock market is said to
"climb to dizzying heights" or when there is said to be a "balance of trade" (see Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).
Yet for all its usefulness, analogy is never formally taught to us. We seem to think of analogy as a
natural human skill, and of the practice of analogy in science as a straightforward extension of its use
in common-sense reasoning. For example, William James believed that "men, taken historically, reason
by analogy long before they have learned to reason by abstract characters" (James, 1890, II, p. 363). All
this points to an appealing intuition: that a facility for analogical reasoning is an innate part of human
cognition, and that the concept of a sound analogy is universal.
In this report we question this intuition. We begin by discussing a framework for analogical reasoning.
We then present examples of scientific uses of analogy from three time periods, working backward from
Sadi Carnot (1796-1832) to Robert Boyle (1627-1691) and finally to a set of alchemists active before
1550. 1 On the basis of these examples, we contrast the style of analogizing practiced by scientists at
different points in history. We believe there are significant differences in the style of thinking, in what
was felt to constitute rigor, in what was accepted as a sound argument and a justifiable conclusion--in
short, in what has been taken to be the logical and scientific use of analogical reasoning. This, raises
questions as to whether the standards of analogical rigor are universal and innate, or whether they are
instead culturally and historically defined.
Before we present our historical analyses, we need to make explicit the constraints that govern analogical
reasoning as it is practiced today. We will then be in a position to compare the uses of analogy across
history.
A Framework for Interpreting and Evaluating Analogy
Analogy can be viewed as a kind of similarity, but not all similarity is analogy. Indeed, analogy gains
much of its power from the selectivity of the commonalities it suggests. When processing an analogy,
people focus on certain kinds of commonalities and ignore others. For example, imagine a bright
student reading the analogy "A cell is like a factory." It is unlikely that he or she would decide that cells
are made of brick and steel and have smokestacks. Instead the student would probably realize that, like
a factory, a cell must take in available resources to keep itself operating and to generate its products.
This focus on abstract commonalities is what makes analogy so illuminating. In the next section, we
present a way of clarifying this intuition.
Structure-Mapping and Ideal Analogical Competence
The theoretical framework for this research is the structure-mapping theory of analogy (Gentner, 1980,
1983, 1988, 1989). This theory aims to describe the implicit constraints that characterize modern
analogical aesthetics. The basic intuition is that an analogy is a mapping of knowledge from one domain
(the base) into another (the target), which conveys that a system of relations that holds among the base
objects also holds among the target objects. Thus an analogy is a way of noticing relational
commonalities independently of the objects in which those relations are embedded. In interpreting an
analogy, people seek to put the objects of the base in one-to-one correspondence with the objects of the
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target so as to obtain maximum structural match. The corresponding objects in the base and target do
not have to resemble each other at all; object correspondences are determined by roles in the matching
relational structures. Central to the mapping process is the principle of systematicity: In selecting
among possible matching relations, people prefer interconnected systems; that is, they prefer sets of
predicates linked by higher order relations such as CAUSE or IMPLIES, rather than isolated predicates.
The systematicity principle is a structural expression of our tacit preference for coherence and deductive
power in interpreting analogy.
Besides analogy, other kinds of similarity matches can be distinguished in this framework, according to
whether the match is one of relational structure, object descriptions, or both. Recall that analogies
discard object descriptions and map relational structure. Mere-appearance matches are the opposite:
They map aspects of object descriptions and discard relational structure. Literal-similarity matches map
both relational structure and object-descriptions.
As an example, consider the Rutherford analogy between the solar system and the hydrogen atom.
Imagine a person hearing it for the first time. (Assume some prior knowledge about the solar system.)
The person must 2
Set up the object correspondences between the two domains: sun -# nucleus and
planet -. electron.
Discard object attributes, such as YELLOW (sun).
Map base relations such as MORE MASSIVE THAN (sun, planet) to the
corresponding objects in the target domain.
Observe systematicity, that is, seek a system of interconnected relations such as MORE
MASSIVE THAN (sun, planet) and REVOLVES-
AROUND (planet, sun) that are linked by higher order constraining relations,
such as CAUSE, such that the whole system can apply in the target as well as
the base. Here, the deepest potentially common system of relations--at least
in 1906--is the central-force system:
CAUSE {AND [ATTRACTS (sun, planet)],
[MORE-MASSIVE-THAN (sun, planet)],
REVOLVE-AROUND (planet, sun)}.
Discard isolated relations, such as HOTTER THAN (sun, planet).
Systematicity
Central to our understanding about analogy is that it conveys a system of connected knowledge, not a
mere assortment of independent facts. The systematicity principle is included to formalize this tacit
preference for coherence and deductive power in analogy. The systematicity principle states that in
analogy there is an implicit selection rule to seek a common system of relations (i.e., a system from the
base that can also apply in the target). That is, among the possible commonalities between base and
target, we seek to find an interconnected predicate structure in which higher order predicates enforce
constraints among lower order predicates.3 A predicate that belongs to such a system is more likely to
be included in the analogy than is an isolated predicate. By promoting deep relational chains, the
systematicity principle operates to promote predicates that participate in causal chains and other
constraining relations.4
The structure-mapping principles have received convergent theoretical support in artificial intelligence
and psychology, as well as in other areas of cognitive science (Burstein, 1983; Hesse, 1966; Hofstadter,
1981; Indurkhya, 1985; Reed, 1987; Rumelhart & Norman, 1981; Winston, 1980, 1981, 1982). There is
widespread agreement on the basic elements of one-to-one mappings of objects with carry-over of
predicates. Further, many of these researchers use the systematicity principle, or a close relation, as
their selection principle. There is also empirical support for the psychological predictions of structure-
mapping theory (Gentner, 1980, 1989; Gentner & Gentner, 1983; Gentner & Toupin, 1986; Reed, 1987;
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Schumacher & Gentner, 1987). In particular, there is evidence to suggest that adults do indeed observe
the aesthetic rules of rigor that structure mapping suggests: that is, that they focus on shared systematic
relational structure in interpreting analogy. First, adults tend to include relations and omit attributes
in their interpretations of analogy; and second, adults judge analogies as more apt and more sound if
they share systematic relational structure (Clement & Gentner, 1988; Gentner, 1989; Gentner &
Clement, 1988; Gentner & Landers, 1985; Gentner & Rattermann, in preparation).
The Rules of Analogical Rigor
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, we propose a set of five implicit rules that modern scientists
use in analogical reasoning. The first three rules, based directly on structure mapping, state constraints
internal to a particular interpretation; the last two rules state external constraints:
1. Structural consistency is maintained. This means, first, that objects are placed in
consistent one-to-one correspondence; that is, a given object in one domain cannot
have more than one counterpart in the analogous domain. Multiple mappings
diminish the clarity of the match. We will refer to violations of this principle as n -
1/1 -n mappings. Second, the connectivity among predicate structures is maintained.
When two predicates are placed in correspondence, the elements that support them
(i.e., that are their arguments) must also be placed in correspondence.
2. Attributes are discarded, whereas relations are preserved. The focus of the analogy
is on matching systems of relations, not objects and their surface attributes. We do
not care whether, for example, the nucleus resembles the sun as an object, only
whether it participates in the same system of relations.
3. The systematicity principle is used to select the most informative common relational
network. Lower order relations that are not contained within such a network are
discarded. Thus, in the Rutherford analogy, the lower order relation HOTTER-
THAN (sun, planet) is not part of the analogy because, although it participates in a
systematic relational structure in the base (that of heat transfer), that system is not
shared with the target.
4. Between-domain relations do not strengthen the analogy. Only commonalities
improve the match; additional associations between the two domains are irrelevant
to the soundness of the match. For example, in the analogy between the solar system
and the atom, it does not make the analogy more sound to observe that the solar
system is made up of atoms.
5. Mixed analogies are avoided. An analogy that builds a relational network in the
target domain by selecting isolated relations from several base domains is not
considered sound. The relational network to be mapped should be entirely contained
within one base domain.
In discussing this last "no mixed analogies" rule, we must distinguish mixed analogies from allowable
cases of multiple analogies (Burstein, 1983; Collins & Gentner, 1987; Schumacher & Gentner, 1987;
Spiro, Feltovich, Coulson, & Anderson, 1989). In some cases, several parallel base analogues are used
to make the same point concerning the target domain. Here, although several analogies embody the
same abstraction, each mapping stands on its own independently of the others (see the discussion of
Boyle's analogies, below). Another allowable case is that in which the target can be partitioned into
separate subsystems, each with a different base analogue. A third allowable case of multiple analogies
is that in which the analogies are alternatives, each used to illuminate a different aspect of the target
(e.g., electricity as flowing water or as crowds of moving particles [Gentner & Gentner, 1983] or
variables viewed as containers or as unknowns [Burstein, 1983]). It does not entail a loss of rigor if
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different analogies are each used separately and consistently. However, when different analogies are
merged, there is often a loss of precision, since the various analogues may suggest different object
correspondences. A reasoner who shifts among analogies without establishing firm rules of intersection
risks a lack of clarity in his or her conclusion. Thus, whereas multiple analogies for the same domain
are sometimes perfectly rigorous, mixed analogies violate the consensual rules of sound thinking and are
vulnerable to challenge.
Finally, analogy between domains is a separate issue from causation between domains. Although
analogy can be used to infer that identical causal relations exist within one domain as within the other,
it cannot be used to infer causation between the base and target domains; nor does evidence of a causal
relation between the domains strengthen an analogy.5
Table 1 summarizes these rules of soundness. Note that although the rules concern only the soundness
evaluation, they are intimately related to the process of making new inferences. As mentioned above,
new inferences are typically made by a process of system completion after some degree of match has
been established. The most typical kind of candidate inference occurs when a predicate is found such
that (a) it exists in the base but not in the target; (b) it belongs to an interconnected system of
predicates in the base; and (c) other predicates in its system have matching predicates in the target.
Then the predicate is postulated to exist in the target as well. That is, the partially matching system is
completed in the target.
[Insert Table 1 about here.]
The five rules do not tell us whether the analogy is factually true; they tell us only whether it is sound.
Verifying the factual validity of an analogy is a separate process. Soundness rules are enormously
helpful in this process, however, because they tell us what must be true in the target in order for the
analogy to be valid. In a rigorous system of matches, even one significant disconfirmation can invalidate
a whole analogy. Thus soundness and validity go hand in hand in hypothesis generation and testing.
In modern cognitive aesthetics, the soundness of an analogy rests solely on the systematic structural
match between the two domains. Given these modem rules of analogical rigor, we now turn to the
question of whether scientists have always adhered to these principles. We begin with Carnot, the most
recent example, and move in reverse chronological order.
Historical Uses of Analogy
Sadi Carnot
The French scientist Sadi Carnot (1796-1832) is well known as a pioneer of modern thermodynamics.
He described the Carnot cycle for heat engines that is still taught as an ideal energy conversion system,
and he laid the foundation for the later discovery of the equivalence of heat and work. In his treatise
on heat, Carnot presented a powerful analogy between heat and water that clarified his position and
generated new questions. His use of analogy is prototypical of the rules of rigor described above, and
can stand as an example of the modern use of analogy.
Before explaining Carnot's analogy, we present a short summary of his work. In 1824, Carnot published
Reflexions sur la puissance motrice du feu (Reflections on the Motive Power of Fire). In this book, he
describes the functioning of a hypothetical engine that can convert heat energy to work. This engine
consists of a cylinder filled with gas and fitted with a frictionless piston that can move freely inside the
cylinder. During a four-stage cycle, the gas inside is expanded by contact with a heat source (isothermal
expansion) and allowed to continue dilation after the source is removed (adiabatic expansion). The gas
is then compressed by transmission of heat to a colder body (isothermal compression), and the volume
further decreases after removal of the cold body (adiabatic compression), restoring the original
conditions of the system. The point of this exercise is that the engine will have absorbed a certain
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amount of heat and converted it to mechanical work through the movement of the piston. The
operation of such an ideal engine became known as the Carnot cycle, and was an important contribution
to the early development of thermodynamics.
Early in his Reflexions, Carnot introduces the analogy between water falling through a waterfall and
caloric (heat) falling through a heat engine. The basic notion of an analogy between heat and fluid was
not new. Indeed, the dominant theory of heat at the time was the caloric theory,6 which defined heat
as a weightless fluid that shared certain properties of ordinary matter. Like other matter, caloric was
a conserved quantity, incapable of being created or destroyed. Thus the idea of some commonality
between heat and water was not new with Carnot, since both are instantiations of a common abstraction
(i.e., both are fluids). What was new was the thoroughness of his development of the analogy--the
extent to which explicit causal structures from the water domain were applied in the heat domain.
Carnot uses the analogy to set forth the principles of a heat engine, and then derives further insights
about the motive power of a heat engine by analyzing the system of relations in the water engine.7
[1] According to established principles at the present time, we can compare with
sufficient accuracy the motive power of heat to that of a waterfall. Each has a
maximum that we cannot exceed, whatever may be, on the one hand, the machine
which is acted upon by the water, and whatever, on the other hand, the substance
acted upon the heat.
[2] The motive power of a waterfall depends on its height and on the quantity of the
liquid; the motive power of heat depends also on the quantity of caloric used, and on
what may be termed, on what in fact we will call, the height of its fall, that is to say,
the difference of temperature of the bodies between the higher and lower reservoirs.
[3] In the waterfall the motive power is exactly proportional to the difference of level
between the higher and lower reservoirs. In the fall of caloric the motive power
undoubtedly increases with the difference of temperature between the warm and the
cold bodies; but we do not know whether it is proportional to this difference. We do
not know, for example, whether the fall of caloric from 100 to 50 degrees furnishes
more or less motive power than the fall of this same caloric from 50 to zero. It is a
question which we propose to examine hereafter.
(Carnot, 1977, p. 15; numbers and paragraph breaks are inserted for
convenience; the original passage is continuous.)
In [1], Carnot introduces the analogy between the motive power of heat and the motive power of water
and establishes a simple, yet important parallel: Just as the amount of power produced by a given fall
of water is limited, the power attainable from a certain transfer of heat is limited. This section
establishes a set of correspondences between the elements of the heat system and the elements of the
water system, as shown in Figures 1 and 2.
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here.]
In [2], Carnot explicates the analogy more explicitly by comparing the difference in temperature between
two bodies to the height of the fall in a waterfall.8 This correspondence between difference in
temperature of two bodies and difference in levels of two reservoirs is crucial to the analogy. Carnot
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uses this correspondence in a proposed higher order relation; he asserts that, in each case, the power
produced by the system depends on both the amount of the substance (water or caloric) that "falls" and
the distance of the "drop" between levels:
DEPENDS-ON {POWER (high, low),
AND [DIFFERENCE (level<high>, level<low>)],
[amount <water> ]}
DEPENDS-ON {POWER (hot, cold),
AND [DIFFERENCE (temperature< hot>, temperature< cold>)],
[amount<heat>]}
This combination of inferences--the fact that power depends on both the difference in level and the
amount of "substance" involved--solidifies the analogy between the two engines. Figure 1 shows the
common relational structure that holds for water and heat; Figure 2 sets forth the predicates in the
water domain that belong to the analogy.
In [3], Carnot demonstrates the use of analogy in suggesting new hypotheses. He notes a higher order
relation in the domain of water power (the fact that the power produced by a given fall of water is
directly proportional to the difference between levels). He then questions whether the same relation
exists for heat engines; that is, does the power produced by a given "fall" of caloric remain constant,
regardless of the temperature at which that fall takes place? This illustrates how analogy can lead to
new research hypotheses.
Carnot's description and application of his analogy meet the five rules of rigorous analogical reasoning
given in Table 1. Carnot pairs the objects in the two domains in one-to-one correspondence based on
relational matches. He disregards attribute matches: He is not concerned with whether corresponding
components share surface qualities. Rather, he focuses on common systematic relational structure. He
seeks to explicate the higher order dependencies common to the two domains and to analyze the
implications of these relational commonalities. Between-domain relations, such as "water contains heat,"
are avoided, and there is no suggestion of a mixed analogy. It is evident that the analogy was useful in
revealing unresolved areas for further research. In short, Carnot's use of analogy is indistinguishable
from the modern scientific use of analogy.
Robert Boyle
We now move back another 130 years to the English scientist Robert Boyle (1627-91). Boyle,
considered by many to be the father of modern chemistry, was one of the first experimenters to dismiss
the widespread practice of attributing human qualities such as "love" and "hate" to inanimate matter.
Probably his most influential work was the Sceptical Chymist; appearing anonymously in 1661 and again
in 1679 with additions, it "did more than any other work of the century to arouse a truly critical spirit
of scientific logic in chemical thinking" (Stillman, 1924, p. 395). Among his accomplishments were a
critique of the view that matter is composed of three or four principles and a proposed empirical route
to discovering the number of elements, a clarification to the account of acids and alkalies, and important
contributions to the understanding of the physics of gases. Boyle was a prolific writer, interested in
philosophy and religion as well as the sciences, and he wrote for the layperson as well as for the
scientist. He was also a prolific analogizer. He often put forth several examples or analogies for each
principle he wanted to prove. These analogies seem to have been intended both as communication
devices and as models to support reasoning.
A characteristic example of Boyle's use of analogy occurs in his book, Of the great effects of even languid
and unheeded local motion, published in 1690. His purpose in this book was to demonstrate the
importance of "local motion," the motions of many tiny particles. Boyle wanted to establish that the
combined effects of the motion of many tiny particles--each invisible and insignificant in itself--can cause
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large-scale changes. He saw such effects as a unifying principle across domains such as light, sound, fire,
and fluids. Although some of his points now seem to need no defense, this was not the case in his time,
and he clearly felt the need to present ample evidence for this conjecture. He cites examples from one
domain after another to support his claims.
Boyle's examples appear to function in two ways. First, they serve as instances of local motion and its
effects--that is, as instances of a principle that can be effectively applied to several domains. The more
numerous and varied the instances, the more faith we can presumably have in the principle. Second,
the examples serve as analogies that can be compared to one. another to yield a common structural
abstraction. By comparing separate instances of local motion, Boyle led his reader to focus on the
common causal system. The following excerpt illustrates his style of analogizing:
(Chap. IV) Observat. III. Men undervalue the motions of bodies too small to be visible or sensible,
notwithstanding their Numerousness, which inables them to act in Swarms.
[1] [Boyle grants that most people think of small particles as like grains of dust, which,
although invisible, cannot penetrate the bodies they fall upon. As a result, these
grains cannot affect the larger bodies.]
But we may have other thoughts, if we well consider, that the Corpuscles we speak
of, are, by their minuteness, assisted, and oftentimes by their figure inabled, to pierce
into the innermost recesses of the body they invade, and distribute themselves to all,
or at least to multitudes of the minute parts, whereof that body consists. For this
being granted, though we suppose each single effluvium or particle to be very minute;
yet, since we may suppose, even solid bodies to be made up of particles that are so
too, and the number of invading particles to be not much inferior to that of the
invaded ones, or at least to be exceedingly great, it not need seem incredible, that a
multitude of little Corpuscles in motion (whose motion, may, for ought we know, be
very swift) should be able to have a considerable operation upon particles either
quiescent, or that have a motion too slow to be perceptible by sense. Which may
perhaps be the better conceived by the help of this gross example:
[2] Example of the anthill
If you turn an Ant-hill well stocked with Ants-eggs, upside down, you may sometimes
see such a heap of eggs mingled with the loose earth, as a few of those Insects, if they
were yoaked together, would not be able at once to draw after them; but if good
numbers of them disperse themselves and range up and down, and each lay hold of
her own egge, and hurry it away, 'tis somewhat surprizing to see (as I have with
pleasure done) how quickly the heap of eggs will be displaced, when almost every
little egge has one of those little Insects to deal with it.
[3] Example of wind in trees
And in those cases, wherein the invading fluid does not quite disjoin and carry off any
great number of the parts of the body it invades, its operation may be illustrated by
that of the wind upon a tree in Autumn: for, it finds or makes it self multitudes of
passages, for the most part crooked, not onely between the branches and twigs, but
the leaves and fruits, and in its passing from the one side to the other of the tree, it
does not onely variously bend the more flexible boughs and twigs, and perhaps make
them grate upon one another, but it breaks off some of the stalks of the fruit, and
makes them fall to the ground, and withall carries off divers of the leaves, that grew
the least firmly on, and in its passage does by its differing act upon a multitude of
leaves all at once, and variously alters their situation.
[4] Examples of sugar and amber dissolving [omitted here].
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[5] Examples of mercury compound dissolving [omitted here].
[6] Example of flame invading metal
But to give instances in Fluid bodies, (which I suppose you will think far the more
difficult part of my task,) though you will easily grant, that the flame of Spirit of wine,
that will burn all away, is but a visible aggregate of such Effluvia swiftly agitated, as
without any sensible Heat would of themselves invisibly exhale away; yet, if you be
pleased to hold the blade of a knife, or a thin plate of Copper, but for a very few
minutes, in the flame of pure Spirit of wine, you will quickly be able to discern by the
great Heat, that is, the various and vehement agitation of the minute Corpuscles of
the metal, what a number of them must have been fiercely agitated by the pervasion
of the igneous particles, if we suppose, (what is highly probable,) that they did
materially penetrate into the innermost parts of the metal; and whether we suppose
this or no, it will, by our experiment, appear, that so fluid and yielding a body, as the
flame of Spirit of wine, is able, almost in a trice, to act very powerfully upon the
hardest metalls.
[7] Example of animal spirits moving animals [omitted here].
[8] Example of rope contracting from humidity [omitted here].
(Boyle, 1690, pp. 27-35)
Boyle begins by noting that laypeople may find it implausible that local motion could have large-scale
effects. Laypersons, he observes, consider such motion similar to the ineffectual motion of dust in air.
By analogy with dust, if particles are very small, then although they can be moved easily, their
movements are inconsequential. The reason, he says, is that they do not penetrate other bodies and
therefore cannot affect those bodies. Having laid out the starting intuition--that local motion is
ineffective--Boyle then defends the opposite position by differentiating the analogy further. He suggests
that there are some kinds of particles involved in local motion that are so small that, unlike dust
particles, they can diffuse through solid objects, and that it is this penetration that allows them to create
large effects. He then proceeds to present instances of this kind of local motion.
The first positive instance [2] considered by Boyle is characteristic of true analogy. He compares the
ability of small particles to move large masses to that of ants to move their eggs. Although the ants are
smaller than the mass of eggs, the ability of each ant to move one egg means (given appropriate relative
numbers of ants and eggs) that the entire mass of eggs can be displaced by the ants. This exemplifies
the principle that a large mass can be moved by the actions of many small particles. The juxtaposition
of disparate examples makes it obvious that the relevant commonalities here are the relations between
the objects, as shown in Figure 3; characteristics of objects are discarded. Boyle uses the anthill analogy
as a rigorous structure-mapping. He does not suggest that the corpuscles involved in local motion are
like ants in themselves; for example, he does not suggest that they are living organisms nor that they
possess any instinctive notions. Nor does Boyle imply that particles of matter are white or soft or
otherwise egglike. Rather, he focuses on the relational commonality: namely, that very large numbers
can compensate for a very great size disadvantage, provided that penetration of the larger by the smaller
can occur. Under these circumstances, many small bodies in motion can carry off a much larger body.
[Insert Figure 3 about here.]
The remaining sections provide several additional analogous examples of the effects of local motion.
For example, in [3], he cites the example of wind passing through a tree, blowing off leaves and breaking
branches. Similarly, in [6], Boyle presents the effects of fire on a knife blade as an instance of local
motion. He perceives fire as composed of many small particles and explains the melting of metal in
terms of the invasion of igneous particles into the metal, with the result that the corpuscles of metal
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themselves become "fiercely agitated" and the blade softens. The remaining two paragraphs, which
describe "animal spirits" and the contraction of rope, respectively, make analogous points. Boyle
observes that although animal spirits may be minute enough to be invisible, they are capable of
propelling large animals such as elephants. He describes seeing hemp shrink in moist weather, and
states that the "aqueous and other humid particles, swimming in the air, entering the pores of the hemp
in great numbers, were able to make it shrink, though a weight of fifty, sixty or even more pounds of
lead were tied at the end to hinder its contraction. . . ." Table 2 shows the correspondences across
Boyle's set of examples.
[Insert Table 2 about here.]
A striking feature of Boyle's writing is the rapid succession of analogies he uses. Unlike Carnot, Boyle
does not dwell on one pair of examples, carefully explicating the critical common relational structure.
His rhetorical approach is to present his hypothesis and then provide a varied series of instances
designed to demonstrate its validity. (Of course, given current domain knowledge, not all the
comparisons are equally convincing.) The implicit message is that if all of these phenomena occur, the
model that summarizes them must be plausible. Each paragraph contains an instance of local motion,
or contrasts situations in which the principles do and do not apply. There is little surface continuity
between these examples; they relate to one another by virtue of their common abstractions. The
common intent is that the examples can be compared with one another to reveal in abstract model of
local motion.
Boyle's use of analogy conforms to the modern standards shown in Table 1. In each of his analogies,
the objects are placed in one-to-one correspondence. Object attributes are discarded: As the
comparison with ants reveals, we are not intended to map the specific characteristics of the base objects
into the target domain of local motion. Indeed, the sheer variety of the examples virtually guarantees
that any specific object characteristics will cancel out. The analogies, in the modern tradition, are about
common relational systems. The complexity of the analogies is not great--they are not as deep as
Carnot's, for example--but this may be due in part to the lesser depth of knowledge of the topic area.
At this early stage, Boyle simply wished to establish that the motion of many small particles can combine
to produce powerful visible effects and that the condition under which this can occur is that the smaller
particles be able to penetrate the larger matter. This systematic set of relations is maintained
throughout these examples. Finally, in spite of the large number of examples, there are no mixed
analogies nor between-domain relations; each example stands on its own as a separate instantiation of
the relational structure.
Carnot and Boyle: A Summary
Boyle and Carnot differ somewhat in their use of analogy. Carnot used one analogy, explaining it
precisely and then going on to use the principles in further inferencing. Boyle, in contrast, offers a
whole family of analogies, one after the other. This difference may have been due to the greater depth
of domain knowledge that existed in Carnot's time, or perhaps in part to a difference in their intellectual
traditions.10 Yet despite these differences, Boyle and Carnot both observe the constraints of structural
consistency and systematicity. They are both essentially modern in their view of what constitutes a
sound analogy.
The Alchemists
We have moved back in time from Carnot (1796-1832) to Boyle (1627-1691). So far, the analogies we
have considered conform to our concept of a valid use of analogy. Now we move back to the alchemists,
and analyze the forms of similarity they used in making their predictions. Rather than focusing on a
single alchemist, we will consider patterns of analogizing from across the field.
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The practice of alchemy, which existed in one form or another from at least A.D. 500 (Burckhardt, 1967),
was a dominant force in Western scientific thought through the middle of the seventeenth century
(Taylor, 1949). Although alchemy has often been maligned, it had many features that should command
respect. It was based upon the belief that all matter had one origin, from which different forms had
evolved. These forms were only the outer manifestations of the common "soul." They were mutable,
so that substances could be converted into one another. The goal of many alchemists was to verify this
theory by converting base metals such as lead into gold or silver, with the help of a putative catalyst
known as the Philosopher's Stone (Redgrove, 1922).
Alchemy took as its domain the spiritual world as well as the physical world. Its adherents relied heavily
on analogies between the spiritual and material planes in deriving their hypotheses. A central belief was
that the "purification" of the base metals into gold was analogous to the spiritual purification of man.
The resolution of either of these problems would lead to an understanding of the other (Redgrove,
1922). This "macrocosm-microcosm" analogy was a foundation of alchemical thought (Debus &
Multhauf, 1966), so that "some men pursued the renewal and glorification of matter, guiding themselves
by this analogy, others the renewal and glorification of man, using the same analogy" (Taylor, 1949, p.
144). The macrocosm-microcosm analogy was central to a wide network of correspondences, in which
nearly every substance or procedure considered essential to the alchemist's craft had one or more
analogues. These analogues could overlap. For instance, whereas metals symbolized heavenly objects
(Burckhardt, 1967), a combination of two metals could be viewed as a marriage (Taylor, 1949). The
alchemists exhibited prolific use of analogy when compared with earlier or later scientists. But the
matches they generated were not necessarily similar to analogies we would use. Indeed, Redgrove,
writing in 1922 (p. xii), stated: "The alchemists cast their theories in a mould entirely fantastic, even
ridiculous--they drew unwarrantable analogies--and hence their views cannot be accepted in these days
of modern science."
What were the rules that governed the alchemists' use of analogy? We begin with a prominent family
of analogies that used as the base domain the egg or the seed, and as the target domain either (or both)
the principles of matter or the components of a human being.
Before considering the analogies themselves, we need to give a brief historical summary of the
alchemists's notions of the principles of matter.11 Based on the works of Plato and Aristotle, alchemical
thought postulated that there was a primordial source of all earthly matter called First Matter. 12 This
First Matter was manifested in a small number of primary elements--fire, air, water, and earth--each
of which combined two of the primary qualities--hot, cold, wet, and dry. For example, as shown in
Table 3, fire was hot and dry, earth was cold and wet, etc. Transmutations occurred if the proportions
of the qualities changed: For example, fire (hot and dry) could be changed into earth (specifically, into
ash) by losing its heat. The alchemists were particularly interested in transmutations of metals,
especially the transmutation of base metals into gold. Such a purifying transmutation would not only
promise great wealth, but convincingly demonstrate that the art was true. Therefore, the theory of
metals held particular interest. During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, metals were generally held
to consist of two components: mercury, which was fiery, active, and male; and sulfur, which was watery,
passive, and female. By the sixteenth century, the dominant belief was that metals were composed of
three components; for example, Paracelsus (1493-1541) proposed a "tria prima," of mercury, sulfur, and
salt, which he held to underlie all mater.
[Insert Table 3 about here.]
The egg. The egg was used widely in analogies. Taken as a whole, the egg could symbolize the
limitlessness generativity of the universe. Thus the Philosopher's Stone was often called an egg
(Cavendish, 1967; Stillman, 1924). The egg could also be divided into components. For example,
Stillman (1924) notes that the shell, skin, white, and yolk of the egg were thought to be analogous to
the four metals involved in transmutation--copper, tin, lead, and iron--although the pairings could vary
between the components and the metals. Several additional correspondences are apparent in the
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following passage, copied in 1478. In this excerpt, translated from Bertholet's (1887) Collection des
anciens alchemistes grecs, the "egg" described is in fact the Philosopher's Stone:' 3
Nomenclature of the Egg. This is the mystery of the art.
1. It has been said that the egg is composed of the four elements, because it is the
image of the world and contains in itself the four elements.. It is called also the
"stone which causes the moon to turn," "stone which is not a stone," "stone of the
eagle," and "brain of alabaster."
2. The shell of the egg is an element like earth, cold and dry, it has been called copper,
iron, tin, lead. The white of the egg is the water divine, the yellow of the egg is
couperose [sulfate], the oily portion is fire.
3. The egg has been called the seed and its shell the skin; its white and its yellow the
flesh, its oily part, the soul, its aqueous, the breath or the air. (Stillman, 1924, pp.
170-171; notation in brackets added)
This brief excerpt illustrates the style of analogizing displayed by many alchemists. First, the egg is
compared to several different analogues. The use of multiple analogues would not in itself differentiate
this passage from the work of Boyle; however, there are some differences. First, there does not appear
to be a common abstraction across the different analogues. The first paragraph maps the egg first onto
the four elements and then onto a series of single entities (e.g., "the stone which is not a stone," the
"brain of alabaster"). In (2) and (3), the components of the egg are successively compared to the four
elements of ancient Greek philosophy (earth, water, air, and fire), 14 the layers of a seed, and the aspects
of a human being. These multiple analogies are rather different from those of Boyle, in part because
the alchemist does not attempt to delineate a common structure that holds across the several systems.
A more striking difference from Boyle arises when we consider the issue of one-to-one mappings. (It
will be recalled that one-to-one correspondence is one of the constraints in current analogizing, and that
Carnot and Boyle both honored this principle.) Figure 4 shows the object correspondences in the above
set of analogies. It is apparent that achieving one-to-one correspondence is not of primary concern.
Indeed, the number of components involved in the correspondence varies from analogue to analogue.
For example, as Figure 4a shows, the object correspondences for the analogy between the egg and the
four elements of matter are such that the element of air must be either omitted (hard to imagine, since
it is clearly one of the four elements of matter) or else placed in correspondence with a previously used
element of the egg, yielding a mapping of four objects onto five. As Figure 4b shows, the mapping from
the egg to the four divisions of the seed (or aspects of a human being) is also not one-to-one, since both
the white and the yellow parts of the egg correspond to the flesh. Thus Figure 4b shows a 5 -4 4
mapping, whereas Figure 4a shows a 4 -. 5 mapping.
[Insert Figures 4a and 4b about here.]
An attractive aspect of the egg was that it was recognized as something vital and as symbolic of a
beginning. Any system that could be related to the egg was imbued with a similar significance. When
some alchemists shifted from the ancient Greek theory of four elements to the theory that three
"principles"--usually defined as sulfur, mercury, and salt (Cavendish, 1967)--composed all matter, at least
one alchemist (for whom arsenic supplanted salt) continued to find the egg analogy appealing:
As an egg is composed of three things, the shell, the white, and the yolk, so is our Philosophical
Egg composed of a body, soul, and spirit. Yet in truth it is but one thing [one mercurial
genus], a trinity in unity and unity in trinity--Sulphur, Mercury, and Arsenic. (Dienheim, in
Hamilton-Jones (Ed.), 1960, p. 79; brackets are his)
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In this passage the alchemist Dienheim suggests a series of parallel analogies among the egg, the
Philosopher's Stone, humankind, and matter and gives the object correspondences among the (now
three) parts of the egg, the three aspects of a human being, and the three principles of matter.
However, he stops short of describing the commonalities that follow from these object correspondences.
This passage illustrates the macrocosm-microcosm analogy in alchemical thought and the importance
of parallels between the material and spiritual planes. It also illustrates the elusiveness of alchemical
analogy: There is no commitment to finding a common abstraction.
Paracelsus. As a further example of the use of analogy in alchemical writing, we present this passage
from Paracelsus (1493-1541). Paracelsus (Theophrastus Bombastus von Hohenheim) was a leading
alchemist of the sixteenth century and a strong proponent of the value of empirical observation as
opposed to received dogma. But despite this pioneering spirit, his use of the analogy remains distinctly
different from modem usage. Here, he describes how gold and silver can be made:
Some one may ask, what, then, is the short and easy way whereby Sol and Luna may be made?
The answer is this: After you have made heaven, or the sphere of Saturn, with its life to run
over the earth, place on it all the planets so that the portion of Luna may be the smallest. Let
all run until heaven or Saturn has entirely disappeared. Then all those planets will remain dead
with their old corruptible bodies, having meanwhile obtained another new, perfect and
incorruptible body. That body is the spirit of heaven. From it these planets again receive a
body and life and live as before. Take this body from the life and earth. Keep it. It is Sol and
Luna. Here you have the Art, clear and entire. If you do not understand it it is well. It is
better that it should be kept concealed and not made public. (Quoted in Jaffe, 1976, p. 23)
Here Sol and Luna (the sun and moon, respectively) signify gold and silver, and other metals in the
recipe are represented by the other planets, according to a widely used system of alchemical analogies
(see below). Paracelsus does not detail the object correspondences between the two domains, nor does
he explain how an action in one domain parallels an action in the other. The mappings and the
theoretical basis for the procedure are left unstated. Indeed, the actual metals being referred to are not
always clear. For example, to what do "earth" and "all those planets" refer? Does "heaven, or the sphere
of Saturn" refer to tin? If so, is the final "spirit of heaven" derived from the process also tin? This last
seems implausible, since the goal is to produce gold and/or silver; yet if the final "spirit of heaven" is
gold or silver, then what about the initial "heaven"?
This passage, though it exemplifies the different rules of analogizing among the alchemists, also raises
questions concerning the reasons for these differences. Paracelsus makes it clear in the last sentence
that clarity is not his intention. The secretive nature of the enterprise, the fact that it was felt necessary
to hide results from the common public and perhaps from competitors, perhaps led to the ambiguity
of the writing. Is it possible that this ambiguity shielded a set of informative analogies? To answer this
question, we must look more closely at the system of analogies that supported this reasoning.
The system of correspondences. Metals held an important place in alchemical analogies. As discussed
above, metals figured in analogies with the principles of matter and with the component parts of a
human being, and the transmutation of base metals into gold or silver was felt to be analogous to the
spiritual purification of man. A further set of rich analogies existed between metals, planets, and colors.
The system of correspondences is given in Table 4. (This table and much of the surrounding explication
are based on Cavendish's valuable discussion [Cavendish, 1967, p. 26].)
[Insert Table 4 about here.]
The perceived importance of surface similarity is evident here. For example, the Sun, the metal Gold,
and the color Gold are linked by a common color, as are the Moon, the metal Silver, and the color
White. A second aspect of this set of correspondences is that the commonalities shift from one part of
the system to another. For example, unlike the two triads just mentioned, the Jupiter/Tin/Blue triad
does not share a common color. Instead, Blue, the color of royalty, is matched to Jupiter because
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Jupiter was lord of the sky. The match between Jupiter and Tin may be a color match, based on the
planet's silvery appearance. Thus not only are surface similarities implicated, but the decision as to
which particular surface similarities figure in the correspondences changes from one part of the system
to another. A further point of difference between this system and modern systems of analogies is that
cross-connections of all kinds enter into the analogies. This excerpt from Cavendish's discussion
illustrates the complex web of similarities that underlies the analogies.
Lead, the darkest and heaviest of the metals, was naturally assigned to Saturn, the dimmest and
slowest-moving planet, which trudges heavily through its slow path round the sun. In the old
cosmology Saturn is the farthest planet from the sun, the ruler of life, and is the lord of death.
The analogy between death and night was drawn very early. Black is the colour of night and
the colour invariably associated with death in Western countries. (Cavendish, 1967, p. 27)
As before, there is a marked emphasis on similarity in object attributes, notably color, in determining
the correspondences. For instance, Black, Lead, and Saturn are all linked through the surface attribute
"dark." A second example of this emphasis on relatively low-order information is the fact that Lead and
Saturn were held to match because both are slow and heavy. In fact, the relation between slowness and
heaviness is different for the two domains. Saturn moves slowly in its orbit and was therefore thought
of as massive ("heavy"). In contrast, lead was known to be a dense ("heavy") metal. Thus the two senses
of heaviness (i.e., large and massive vs. dense) matched here are not the same. Moreover, the direction
of inference is different for the two domains: Lead is heavy and therefore inferred to be slow; Saturn
is slow and therefore inferred to be heavy. The looseness of the matches between heaviness and
slowness in the two domains did not apparently count against the analogy.
Still another difference from modern usage that stands out here is the extreme variety in the types of
relations that could justify a given object correspondence. For example, consider the connection
between Saturn and Black. Saturn is the lord of death; death is (in some ways) similar to night, and
the color of a night sky is Black; further, Blackness symbolizes death. Thus at least two chains exist
between the planet Saturn and the color Black.
The heterogeneity of matches that could figure in an analogy here contrasts sharply with the modern
aesthetic in which only relations that are parallel across the domains count for the analogy.15 In a
modem analogy we would expect identical relations to hold across the system; that is, we would expect
to find the same relations holding for each pair:
Moon:White :: Sun:Golden :: Jupiter:Blue :: Saturn:Black
In the alchemical system there is no such requirement: The relations that link Jupiter and Blue are
allowed to be completely different from those that link Moon and White."6 As another instance of
relational heterogeneity, consider the match between Red and Mars. Cavendish (1967, p. 27) notes that
it is based on several chains of associations: (a) Mars looks Red; (b) Mars was the god of war, war is
associated with bloodshed, and blood is Red; (c) faces are painted Red in war; (d) Mars is held to rule
violent energy and activity, and Red is the color symbolizing energy. .Because of these multiple paths,
Mars and Red were held to be analogous. This illustrates how alchemists differ from modern
analogizers with respect to the "no extraneous relations" rule. In the current aesthetic, once the parallel
set of relations is established, other relations do not add to the analogy. But for the alchemists, finding




The alchemists' use of analogy in their writings differed from that of Boyle and Carnot and other more
modem scientists. In the examples we have considered, it can be seen that the alchemists violated
almost every one of six precepts for analogical rigor given in Table 1 and recapitulated here:
1. Structural consistency is enforced: Objects are placed in one-to-one correspondence,
and predicate connectivity (or support) is maintained.
2. Relational systems are preserved and object descriptions disregarded.
3. Systematicity is used to select the most informative common relational network.
4. Between-domain relations do not strengthen an analogy.
5. Mixed analogies are avoided.
6. Analogy is not causation.
These disparities seem to represent a true difference in the. style of analogical reasoning. Yet before
drawing conclusions, we must consider two other factors that may have contributed to the differences.
First, the vagueness inherent in alchemical analogy might have stemmed from a desire for secrecy, as
discussed above. Certainly the desire for secrecy played a role in the ambiguous quality of alchemical
analogy. In order to prevent laypeople from understanding the mysteries of alchemy, its practitioners
disguised their recipes with symbolism and vagueness, and this undoubtedly contributed to the ambiguity
of the analogies. But although this explanation is probably correct as far as it goes, it will not account
for all of the facts. In particular, it will not account for the alchemists' fondness for correspondences
based on (a) surface similarity and (b) multiple linking paths, for it is precisely these kinds of
correspondences that would easily be guessed by an outsider. For example, the connection among the
Moon, the metal Silver, and the color White would have been easy for an outsider to deduce; and the
rich set of relations linking Mars and Red made it unmistakable that the two should be placed in
correspondence. In modem analogy, the object correspondences are often more difficult to grasp
initially than in alchemical analogies because the correspondences are based purely on like roles in the
matching relational system, with no direct object similarity. For example, in Boyle's analogy between
ants moving a mass of eggs and wind stripping the leaves off a tree, the object correspondences between
ants and air particles and ant eggs and leaves are not at all obvious a priori; they are not suggested by
surface similarity, nor are there multiple paths linking, for example, air particles and leaves. Thus a
modern analogy may be far harder for a newcomer to grasp initially than are the alchemists' analogies.
Clearly, not all the disparities between alchemical analogy and modern analogy can be accounted for
by the desire to achieve secrecy.17
A second and deeper difference between alchemists and modem scientists is the fact that the alchemists
had rather more complex goals. They were concerned with understanding both the material and
spiritual worlds, and they used several forms of macrocosm-microcosm analogies to link the two planes.
Alchemists often invested this analogy between the spiritual and material planes with dual-causal powers.
A scientist who wished to purify a base metal into gold must, they thought, also purify his spirit.
Modern science separates personal virtue from excellence in research, and although this separation has
its disadvantages, it simplifies the enterprise. To compound this difference in goals, it has been
suggested that the alchemists may have been relatively more focused on power and control than on
knowledge. It is hard to say how much of the apparent disparity in reasoning style might have stemmed
from these different motivations.
With the foregoing cautions, we now consider whether the disparities in analogizing suggest a genuine
difference in reasoning style. (See also Campbell, 1987, for a discussion of factors relating to such a
conclusion.) Some of the differences--notably violations of precepts 2 (preserve relations rather than
attributes) and 3 (aim for systematicity); see The rules of analogical rigor, above--could reasonably be
attributed to simple lack of domain knowledge. Later scientists, such as Carnot and Boyle, had the
benefit of more extensive sets of existing principles on which to base their analogies. The alchemists'
use of surface similarity instead of common relational structure could be defended as a perfectly
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reasonable initial way to proceed, given the relative lack of domain knowledge. Indeed, there is
considerable evidence from studies of analogical development (Billow, 1975; Gentner, 1989; Gentner &
Toupin, 1986) and from novice-expert studies in learning physics (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981) to
suggest that novice learners judge similarity by common object attributes whereas adults judge similarity
by common relational structure. Such a bias can be defended on grounds of cognitive economy: Why
postulate relational commonalities until you are sure that attribute commonalities are inadequate? Thus
the alchemists' deviations on precepts 2 and 3 cannot be taken as evidence of a different style of
thinking, only of a difference in amount of knowledge.
When we turn to the remaining precepts, the domain knowledge interpretation is less plausible. The
fact that the alchemists felt no need for one-to-one correspondences, their fondness for between-domain
relations and mixed analogies, and their propensity to ascribe causal powers to analogy and similarity
all seem to point to a true difference in their sense of the implicit rules of analogy. Thus the alchemists,
in attempting to gain an understanding of their world, used a very different set of inference rules from
that of later scientists. Returning to the central question of this chapter, we conclude that the rules of
analogical soundness are not innate. Despite the seeming inevitability of the analogical precepts we now
use, they are not a necessary part of natural logic.
The style of analogical reasoning in alchemy and chemistry seems to have changed between the time
of the Paracelsus and that of Boyle (1627-1691). This change was to some degree domain-specific, for
true analogies were used in physics and astronomy before they were in alchemy and chemistry. Kepler
(1571-1630) and Galileo (1564-1642), each working within about 70 years of Paracelsus, were as elegant
in their use of analogy as any modern thinker. For example, Kepler, grappling with the notion of action
at a distance, developed a deep analogy between light and a force he hypothesized to emanate from the
sun. Just as light cannot be apprehended as it travels through the space, yet produces an effect when
it reaches its destination, so might it be with this new force.'" Galileo used an analogy between the
earth and a ship to argue that the earth moves despite the evidence of our senses (see Gentner, 1982).
These analogies are as rigorous and systematic as the analogies of modern scientists. This makes the
contrast in analogical style between, say, Paracelsus and the later chemists all the more striking. It
suggests a domain-specific progression in alchemy and chemistry from one set of implicit rules governing
the practice of analogical reasoning in 1500 to another set in 1700. (Whether a similar evolution
occurred in astronomy and physics prior to 1600 and whether the practice in alchemy was influenced
by the more rigorous practice in physics and astronomy are issues beyond the scope of this report.)
The evidence reviewed here suggests that analogical rigor as we practice it today has not been universal
in the history of science. The skilled practice of analogical reasoning does not appear to be an innate
human skill, and learning the habit of rigorous analogizing does not appear to be a universal
achievement like learning the grammar of a language. Yet we do not wish to take the opposite position,
that analogy is an esoteric ability available only to a few. On the contrary, we suspect that the ability
to see relational matches at least some of the time is universal. What does not appear to be universal
is a demarcation between analogy and other forms of similarity, in which a special role and a distinct
set of rules are accorded to analogy in reasoning.
Perhaps analogy is more like mathematics than it is like language. If we liken the human intuitive
perception of similarity to our intuitive ability to estimate numerosity, then possessing the rules of
analogical rigor is like possessing the rules of arithmetic. The analogy can be pursued further. Just as
whole cultures existed and estimated quantities without inventing key notions of arithmetic (such as the
idea of a zero), so a people may use similarity comparisons without developing the notion of a sound
analogy. Again, in a premathematical society, instances of perfectly correct calculation will occur
intermixed with other less reliable kinds of estimation. So too with analogy: For example, some of the
alchemists' comparisons would qualify as sound analogies, though many would not. But the most
important commonality is that once a rigorous method has been culturally codified, it is accorded a
special role. Strict analogy, like arithmetic, is now the method of choice when correctness is important.
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Finally, in neither case do the formal methods totally supplant the prior forms of reasoning. There are
occasions when rough estimation is more appropriate than carrying out arithmetic; and there are
occasions--such as reading poetry--when appearance matches or mixed metaphors are more appropriate
than strict analogy.
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Footnotes
1. We originally intended to use models of heat as a unifying theme, and indeed the passages from
Boyle and Carnot are both concerned in part with the nature of heat. However, we were not
successful in finding alchemical passages dealing extensively with heat, and so the alchemical
passages considered here cover a range of phenomena.
2. The order shown here should not be taken as the order of processing; in fact, selecting the object
correspondences may often be the last step (Falkenhainer, Forbus, & Gentner, 1986, 1989/90).
3. The order of a relation is determined by the order of its arguments. A first-order relation is one
that takes objects as its arguments. A second-order relation has at least one first-order relation
among its arguments. An nth-order relation has at least one (n - 1)th-order argument.
4. Systematicity is operationalized in the computer simulation of structure mapping as follows: Any
match between two relations in base and target--for example, MORE MASSIVE THAN (sun,
planet) and MORE MASSIVE THAN (nucleus, electron)--is given a higher evaluation if the parent
relation (i.e., the relation immediately dominating them) also matches (Falkenhainer, Forbus, &
Gentner, 1986, 1989/90; Gentner, 1989).
5. As with the other precepts, there are occasional violations of this maxim: For example, in a survey
of the analogies used to explain cognition in the history of psychology, Gentner and Grudin (1985)
found that certain brain-based analogies (such as "concepts as reverberating circuits") seemed to
take on extra authority because of the known causal connection between brain and cognition.
6. The caloric theory was widely accepted until Joule and other experimenters in the 1840s
demonstrated the interconvertability of heat and work (Wilson, 1981). Carnot's reliance on the
caloric theory did not invalidate his basic conclusions regarding the cycle, although some later
statements in Reflexions are unsound when viewed from the perspective of the mechanical theory
of heat (Fox, 1971).
7. It has been suggested that Carnot's theories were strongly influenced by the work of engineers of
his era, and that his book was intended to advance engineering technology (Cardwell, 1965; Fox,
1971; Kuhn, 1959) and popularize the use of heat power (Wilson, 1981). This purpose would
explain Carnot's need for the analogy as an explanatory device.
8. Although Carnot refers to a waterfall, his discussion may have been based not merely on waterfalls,
but on some kind of water engine, such as a water wheel or a column-of-water engine (Cardwell,
1965).
9. Carnot's solution to this question was affected by his reliance on the questionable data of other
scientists. For a detailed discussion see Fox (1971). For our purposes, however, the answer to the
question is not as important as the fact that the question arises from the analogy.
10. It is tempting to speculate, along the lines of Hesse's (1966) insightful discussion, that at least part
of the difference in analogical style between Carnot and Boyle stems from differences in intellectual
tradition among French and English. Hesse notes that French academics were inclined to think of
analogy as vague and unsatisfactory, at best a mental crutch to use until a formal model could be
devised. In contrast, in the English tradition, mechanical analogies were valued as sources of
insight, especially with respect to preserving causation. From this perspective it is not surprising
that Boyle is a more enthusiastic analogizer than Carnot.
11. This discussion is taken largely from Cavendish (1967, pp. 143-180).
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12. Boyle, in the seventeenth century, was among the first to challenge this doctrine.
13. Although this passage was copied in 1478, its exact date of origin is difficult to pinpoint. Other
manuscripts from this collection are believed to have existed since before the fourth century in one
form or another (Stillman, 1924).
14. However, this is an unusual (perhaps a transitional) account of the elements. The elements listed
are earth (or metal), water, couperose (or sulfur or sulfate) and fire, with air not explicitly
mentioned.
15. Contrast the complexity and elusiveness of the relations underlying Table 4, and especially their
variability across rows and columns, with the factorial regularity of the relations underlying the
modem periodic table of the elements.
16. An alternate way of describing the alchemical aesthetic is to say that the relations involved are
extremely nonspecific, for example, "associated in some way" or "often co-occurring." Under that
description, the alchemist would not be guilty of shifting relations between parallel analogues.
However, this degree of nonspecificity of relations would still constitute a marked difference from
modem usage.
17. However, the penchant for secrecy might have had indirect effects if it discouraged group
collaboration on the analogies. As Boyd (1979) points out, one striking difference between scientific
analogy and literary metaphor as practiced today is that an explanatory analogy is considered to be
part of the public domain, so that it is common for scientists to improve on one another's analogies.
If nothing else, the alchemical desire for secrecy must have interfered with this process of collegial
tinkering.
18. This force is clearly a precursor of Newton's notion of gravity, about 80 years later.
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Table 1
Constraints on Analogical Reasoning
1. Structural consistency. (a) Objects from base and target are placed in one-to-one correspondence.
(b) Predicate connectivity, or support, is preserved in the mapping.
2. Relational focus. Relational systems are preserved and object descriptions disregarded. Object
correspondences are determined not by intrinsic resemblances between the objects but by whether
the objects participate in identical systems of relations.
3. Systematicity. In selecting among several common relations, common systems of relations are
preferred: Lower order relations governed by a higher order relation are more likely to be included
in the interpretation of an analogy than are isolated lower order relations.
4. Between-domain relations do not strengthen an analogy. Additional connections between the base
and target domain do not increase the soundness of a match.
5. Mixed analogies are avoided. The relational network to be mapped should be entirely contained
within one base domain; it is unsound to combine relations from several base domains.
6. Analogy is not causation. An analogical resemblance between two situations is not evidence that
one of them causes the other.
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Dienheim's Analogy and Related Analogies of the Later Alchemists
Dienheim's analogy Further correspondencesa
Three
Three components Three
parts of the elements Two Four
of the Philosopher's of male-female primary
egg Stone matter principles qualities
White Soul Sulfur Male Fire
Yolk Spirit Mercury Male-female Air/water
Shell Body Arsenic Female Earth
(salt)
aMost of these correspondences were in common use during later alchemical times.
Source: Columns 2-5 are from Cavendish (1967, p. 169).
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Table 4
The Alchemical System of Correspondences Among Planets, Metals, and Colors
Planets Metals Colors
. Sun Gold Gold, yellow
Moon Silver White





Source: Cavendish (1967, p. 26).
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Carnot's analogy: the common relational structure for water and heat.
Figure 2. Propositions derivable from Carnot's water/heat analogy.
Figure 3. Boyle's analogy: the common relational structure for ants moving eggs and wind blowing
leaves.
Figure 4. Object correspondences in the egg analogy.
Figure 1




















Propositions Derivable From Carnot's Water/Heat Analogy
1. * water: DIFFERENCE (level <h>, level <1>)
' healt DIFFERENCE (temp <h>, temp <c>)
2. * water: FLOW (h, I)
* heal FLOW (h, c)
3 * water POWER (h, I)
* heat POWER (h, c)
4. * water: MAX POWER (h, I)
* heal: MAX POWER (h. c)
5 * waler; (, o (POWER (h. 1), DIFFERENCE
* heal: (t, (POWER (h. c). DIFFERENCE
6 * water: (L O (POWER (h., 1), amt <h>j
* heal (L O [POWER (h, c). aml <h>J
(level <h>. level <lv))
(temp <h>. onemtp <c>))
7. * water: AND ( 4(0o (POWER (h, I), DIFFERENCE (level <h>. level <1>)],
U( (POWER (h, I), aml ch>l)
* heal: AND ( (tL (POWER (h, c), DIFFERENCE (temp <h, temp <c>),







CAUSE (DIFFERENCE (level h>,. level <1>), FLOW (h, I)J
CAUSE (DIFFERENCE (temp <h>, temp <c>), FLOW (h. c)j
(L (FLOW (h, 1), DIFFERENCE (level <h>, level <l>)j
(LX FLOW (h, c), DIFFERENCE (lemp ,h>, temp <c>)J
CAUSE [DIFFERENCE (level <h>, level <1>, POWER (h, I)]
CAUSE [DIFFERENCE (temp <h>, temp <c>, POWER (h, c)]
11. * water: CAUSE (FLOW (h, 1), POWER (h, I))
* heat: CAUSE [FLOW (h, c), POWER (h, c))
Figure 3































. . .. . . . . •lgP • 11%M TvivV •
f



